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United States Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons face increasing maintenance 
requirements to keep their aging aircraft operationally ready. Each squadron maintenance 
department has six production work centers (WCs) that specialize in different 
maintenance activities. Each Marine in one of the six production WCs belongs to one of 
three categories of experience level, with some maintenance actions requiring 
certification by a member of the most experienced category before an aircraft can fly. 
This thesis formulates the Manpower Validation Planner (MVP), an integer linear 
program that daily assigns tasks to available Marines from each WC and experience level 
to a squadron’s maintenance actions, with the requirement to keep a standard number of 
aircraft operationally ready. We demonstrate the MVP using two years of daily 
maintenance and manning data from five F/A-18 squadrons to calculate the number of 
used, unused, and deficit hours of work. Our baseline analysis shows the majority of 
WCs in an F/A-18 maintenance department have sufficient manpower available, but that 
two WCs are overtasked. Additional analysis shows the impossibility of keeping the 
required number of aircraft operationally ready given the time available to fix aircraft and 
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Across United States Marine Corps (USMC) aviation, squadrons are short of the 
requisite number of Ready Basic Aircraft (RBA) to sustain required levels of aircrew 
readiness. This is especially true in the F/A-18 community, which has seen a reduction in 
readiness as a result of rising numbers of aircraft in depot-level maintenance, flight hour 
usage beyond planned levels due to 15 years of combat operations, and continual delays 
in the delivery of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). In order to be ready to fight tonight, 
the aircraft on the flight line need to be kept “up” and ready to fly.  
USMC F/A-18 squadrons face increasing maintenance requirements to keep their 
aging aircraft operationally ready. Each squadron has 13 maintenance work centers 
(WCs) that specialize in different maintenance activities. Of that, six are considered 
production WCs. Each Marine in one of the six production WCs belongs to one of three 
categories of experience level, with some maintenance actions requiring certification by a 
member of the most experienced level before an aircraft can fly.  
This thesis formulates the Manpower Validation Planner (MVP), an integer linear 
program that daily assigns tasks to available Marines from each WC and each experience 
level to a squadron’s maintenance actions, with the requirement to keep a standard 
number of aircraft operationally ready. We demonstrate the MVP using two years of 
daily maintenance and manning data from five F/A-18 squadrons to calculate the number 
of used, unused, and deficit hours of work.  
Our baseline analysis shows that the majority of WCs in an F/A-18 maintenance 
department have sufficient manpower available but two WCs are overtasked. Excursions 
investigate the impact of changes to manpower. For example, increasing the Seat Shop 
WC by one Marine helps lessen overtasking but does not eliminate it completely.  
Due to an increase in the maintenance requirements of an aging F/A-18, 
additional analysis shows the impossibility of keeping the standard number of aircraft 
operationally ready every day given the time available to fix aircraft. Squadrons normally 
plan for a maintenance day at least once a month when no flight operations occur. 
 xvi 
Planning more maintenance days into a squadron’s calendar improves the time available 
but MVP finds two maintenance days each month is still insufficient to meet the required 
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United States Marine Corps Fighter/Attack (F/A) squadrons face increasing 
maintenance requirements to keep their aging aircraft operationally ready. Each squadron 
has 13 maintenance work centers (WCs), of which six are considered production WCs 
that specialize in different maintenance activities. Each Marine in one of the six 
production WCs belongs to one of three categories of experience level, with some 
maintenance actions requiring certification by a member of the most experienced level 
before an aircraft can fly. This thesis formulates, implements, and demonstrates the MVP, 
an integer linear program that daily assigns tasks to available Marines from each WC and 
each experience level to a squadron’s maintenance actions, with the goal of keeping as 
many aircraft as possible operationally ready.  
A.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the framework of Organizational Level 
(O-Level) Maintenance, readiness as it pertains to F/A-18 Hornets in the USMC, 
manning, and the thesis problem. Chapter II presents research related to this thesis. 
Chapter III introduces a representative MVP integer linear program. Chapter IV 
summarizes the MVP data assumptions, the MVP implementation, and results. Chapter V 
provides recommendations and suggested further research.  
B. USMC F/A-18 SQUADRON STRUCTURE 
The F/A-18 Hornet (Figure 1) first entered operational service for the USMC in 
January 1983 (Flying Leathernecks 2016) and over the years there have been four model 
variants produced: A, B, C, and D. The A and C models have a single seat and the B and 
D models have two seats. There have been modifications to all of them, with all but the A 
model retaining its original designation. After undergoing two significant modifications, 
the A model is now the A++.  
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Figure 1.  Two F/A-18Ds from VMFA(AW)-121 Conduct Training over 
the California Desert. Source: Carlson 2006. 
There are currently 13 USMC Hornet squadrons, including active, reserve, and 
training squadrons, flying all models of the F/A-18. The active and reserve squadrons are 
either Fixed Wing Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) or Fixed Wing Marine All Weather 
Fighter Attack (VMFA(AW)), the former flies the single seat variant and the latter the 
two seat variant.  
The mission of a VMFA squadron is to “Support the MAGTF [Marine Air-
Ground Task Force] Commander by destroying surface targets and enemy aircraft, day or 
night under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint or combined operations” 
(Commandant of the Marine Corps [CMC] 2012a). The mission of a VMFA(AW) 
squadron is to “Support the MAGTF Commander by supporting arms coordination, 
conducting multi-sensor imagery reconnaissance, and destroying surface targets and 
enemy aircraft, day or night under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint or 
combined operations” (CMC 2012a). The additional missions for VMFA(AW) squadrons 
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require an additional crewmember, a Weapons Systems Officer (WSO), and an increase 
in the capabilities of the aircraft.  
Each USMC Hornet squadron, with the exception of the training squadron, is 
ideally composed of 12 F/A-18s. Manning is slightly different between them, a VMFA 
squadron has a Table of Organization (T/O) describing the required rank and Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) for a squadron consisting of 23 officers and 167 enlisted 
Marines and a VMFA(AW) squadron has a T/O structure of 42 officers and 164 enlisted 
Marines (USMC 2015). The enlisted manning is very similar between the two types of 
squadrons but the officer structure is very different due to the addition of 19 WSOs to a 
VMFA(AW) squadron (USMC 2015). Each squadron has seven departments, such as 
administration and operations, but the maintenance department has roughly 140 to 150 
assigned Marines (USMC 2015). 
C. USMC F/A-18 SQUADRON MAINTENANCE  
There are three levels of F/A-18 maintenance repairs: O-Level, completed by 
Marines in a squadron; Intermediate Level (I-Level), completed by Marines in a Marine 
Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS); and depot-level, completed by civilian artisans 
either on-site or at a Fleet Readiness Center (FRC). This thesis only considers O-Level 
maintainers. There are 13 O-Level WCs in an F/A-18 squadron with the six production 
WCs being the focus of this thesis. The production WCs are Airframes Shop (WC 120 
and MOS 6257), Communications and Avionics Shop (WC 210 and MOS 6317), Electric 
Shop (WC 220 and MOS 6337), Ordnance Shop (WC 230 and MOS 6531), Powerline 
Shop (WC 310 and MOS 6217), and Seat Shop (WC 13B and MOS 6287).  
When an aircraft requires any type of maintenance, Marines generate a 
Maintenance Action Form (MAF). The MAF contains a description of the problem and 
the applicable work center. As work on the MAF begins, workers of the appropriate skill 
level are assigned and parts are ordered if necessary. The MAF is considered “signed-off” 
when a maintainer of the appropriate skill level inspects the work to ensure the corrective 
action complies with specifications.  
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Each Marine in a production WC belongs to one of three maintenance 
qualification categories: mechanic/technician; Collateral Duty Inspector (CDI); or the 
highest level of qualification, Collateral Duty Quality Assurance Representative 
(CDQAR). Each maintenance action or repair, documented on a MAF, typically requires 
a mixture of skill levels from each MOS, beginning with the mechanic/technician, then 
the CDI, and the CDQAR (Figure 2). Only the CDIs and CDQARs have the authority to 
“sign-off” a MAF signifying the repair is complete. CDIs have specific maintenance 
actions they “sign-off” for their WC, whereas CDQARs have authority to “sign-off” all 
maintenance actions for their WC.  
 
Figure 2.  A Powerline WC CDQAR Conducting Maintenance on an 
F/A-18 Engine. Source: Marines 2013. 
The amount of maintenance to be conducted in an F/A-18 squadron varies on a 
daily basis. There are two categories of maintenance: scheduled and unscheduled. 
Scheduled maintenance is time-based maintenance that is either on a calendar-day cycle 
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or flight-hour usage cycle. The calendar days, with cycles that can vary from 7 to 728 
days, are easier to plan for than flight hour based, which have cycles that can vary from 
10 to 600 hours. The unscheduled maintenance is random; while there may be some level 
of intuition that something is about to break, it is difficult to know exactly what part will 
break or when it will occur.  
There is an additional category of scheduled maintenance dictated by Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) for the entire inventory of F/A-18s that requires aircraft 
be flown to an FRC for Planned Maintenance Induction (PMI). There are two sequential 
PMI events, PMI-1, which is scheduled for 240–290 work days, and PMI-2, which 
follows PMI-1 and is scheduled for 42–56 work days, both depending on FRC location 
(NAVAIR 2016b). Recently both PMIs have experienced significant delays and the most 
recent completion time for PMI-1 is between 357–487 work days and 61–63 work days 
for PMI-2, both depending on FRC location (NAVAIR 2016b). The arrival date for an 
aircraft is almost unchangeable while the return date changes frequently, potentially twice 
as long as in the original timeline.  
There is also an additional category of unscheduled maintenance called an In-
Service Repair (ISR). An ISR, such as the repair for the fuselage skin crack shown in 
Figure 3, is a depot level repair where artisans travel to an aircraft’s location to complete 
the repair. Generally these repairs take only days to complete but there can be lengthy 
delays before work commences. Almost every ISR requires a specific engineering 
instruction prior to work commencing and there is generally a backlog of engineering 





Figure 3.  Fuselage Skin Crack on F/A-18D requiring ISR. 
D. USMC F/A-18 AIRCRAFT MISSION AND REPORTING STATUS 
 Daily, each aircraft is in one of two reporting status conditions: In-Reporting (IR) 
status and Out-Of Reporting (OOR) status. O-Level maintainers only work on IR aircraft. 
An aircraft in OOR status has a serious maintenance issue that requires repair by a depot 
level artisan.  
Each IR aircraft is in one of three mission level statuses: Full Mission Capable 
(FMC); Partial Mission Capable (PMC); and Non-Mission Capable (NMC). A FMC 
aircraft can fly and there are no outstanding MAFs on the aircraft (in other words, all 
systems are fully functional). A PMC aircraft can fly but there is at least one open PMC 
MAF (pending “sign-off”) on the aircraft signifying that not all systems are fully 
functional. For the purpose of this thesis, we use Mission Capable (MC) for an aircraft 
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that is either FMC or PMC (a MC aircraft is considered “up,” and can fly). Additionally, 
we assume a MC aircraft is a RBA. NMC aircraft either have at least one open NMC 
MAF that makes the aircraft non-flyable or has accumulated more than ten open PMC 
MAFs. In both cases, the aircraft is NMC, or “down,” and unable to fly. 
E. MAINTENANCE DAY 
In each month there is rarely sufficient time to keep up with maintenance 
requirements without taking a day off from flight operations. Squadrons normally plan 
for a maintenance day at least once a month when no flight operations occur. Depending 
on the aircraft health in the squadron, the squadron may schedule more than one 
maintenance day per month.  
In addition to scheduling a maintenance day, a squadron can also work overtime 
based on a recommendation from the Aircraft Maintenance Officer (AMO) and 
concurrence from the Commanding Officer (CO). There are a maximum number of days 
that overtime can be worked per month based on an unwritten rule for how many days it 
is beneficial for a squadron to do so. Working overtime during the week is referred to as 
12 on/12 off. The maintenance department is always split into two crews, day crew and 
night crew, with the exception being single crew operations when manning levels are 
lower, such as block leave periods. During 12 on/12 off operations, day crew works from 
0700–1900 and night crew works from 1900–0700. Aside from additional hours to work 
on aircraft, there are additional benefits to around the clock maintenance such as face to 
face information exchanges. This allows the oncoming crew to have a complete picture of 
what the off-going crew has been working on and where they need to concentrate their 
efforts.  
F. USMC F/A-18 SQUADRON FLIGHT OPERATIONS  
Assuming a squadron has 12 aircraft IR, there are different requirements for the 
daily number of MC aircraft depending on the day’s flight schedule. Aircraft almost 
always launch as a section (two aircraft), the major exception being a Functional Check 
Flight (FCF), which are single ship flights to check airworthiness after completion of 
specific maintenance actions. The rule of thumb is for every two aircraft on the schedule 
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to fly, one additional aircraft is ready as a back-up. A typical flight schedule consists of 
three separate launches with six aircraft in each launch for a total of 18 aircraft sorties 
(flights) per day. Using the rule of thumb, this equates to having nine RBA available for 
each launch.  
The squadron CO makes a decision daily how best to keep the squadron 
sustainable from both a tactical and personnel readiness standpoint. The CO weighs the 
factors and must decide whether the best course of action is to work longer in a day, 
series of days, or even on the weekend, in order to have more RBA. The counter to 
working longer is the negative impact it will have on the morale and overall readiness of 
the squadron. There are times it makes sense to work longer based on different factors. 
However, sometimes it is more beneficial to trim the flight schedule and allow the 
maintenance department an opportunity to continue fixing aircraft while also not risking 
more aircraft returning from flights with MAFs, thereby increasing the backlog of work 
to accomplish. The CO and AMO can declare additional maintenance days in order to 
improve the readiness of the squadron.  
G. USMC F/A-18 SQUADRON MANNING 
There are several factors that govern the manning level in a squadron, the first is 
the T/O. The USMC mans, staffs, and assigns Marines to squadrons in accordance with 
the staffing goal as set by the CMC in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5320.12H against 
requirements stated in the Total Force System Management System (TFSMS) and in 
accordance with the Authorized Strength Report (ASR). The ASR limits the number of 
Marines the USMC can afford, which depends on the end strength authorized by 
Congress. The ASR sets a minimum manning level at 97% of T/O for operational 
squadrons (CMC 2012b). As the F/A-18 has aged, the maintenance to keep an aircraft 
MC has increased yet manning numbers have not undergone significant changes for F/A-
18 squadrons over the last seven years; in fact there has been a slight reduction (USMC 
2009–2016a). This issue highlights the problem and gives rise to the question, do F/A-18 
squadrons have the correct number of mechanics/technicians, CDIs and CDQARs in 
order to maintain readiness levels to be able to fight tonight? 
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H. USMC F/A-18 READINESS ISSUES 
The F/A-18 Hornet is the backbone of USMC Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) and 
has been deploying to the Middle East in support of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) since 2001 as well as continuing support of the Unit 
Deployment Program (UDP) to Iwakuni, Japan. The amount of flight time that has been 
expended on the F/A-18 over the past 15 years is far greater than initially planned or 
budgeted. The JSF, the F/A-18 replacement aircraft, which has been plagued by delays 
and cost over-runs, has not replaced the F/A-18 as quickly as planned (Mizokami 2016). 
These circumstances have led to the extension of the F/A-18 beyond original design 
specifications.  
The F/A-18 was initially purchased with the expectation of being in service for 
6,000 flight hours. Due to a high operational tempo and delays with the JSF, the F/A-18 
service life has been extended, with some aircraft extended out to 10,000 flight hours 
(Myers 2015), a number that could potentially grow larger. As the F/A-18 has flown past 
its initial service limit, it has led to problems that were not anticipated during the 
acquisition process. These issues have resulted in an increase in the amount of 
maintenance required to keep an F/A-18 MC (F/A-18 TMS Community 2013). 
In addition to increased maintenance requirements for the O-Level, Lieutenant 
General Jon M. Davis, USMC Deputy Commandant for Aviation (DCA) states that RBA 
numbers are down “due to In-Service Repairs (ISR), Out of Reporting (OOR) and Depot-
level maintenance backlogs” (Davis 2015). The increase in number of repairs, delays in 
receiving aircraft back from PMI, while still having to maintain the timeline for sending 
aircraft to PMI, make it even more imperative that squadrons keep the aircraft they have 
on hand MC and flying.  
The increase in maintenance equates to a greater number of maintenance actions 
that necessitate a “sign-off” by either a CDI or a CDQAR. If a squadron does not have 
the correct number of aircraft mechanics/technicians, CDIs, and CDQARs, it will fail to 
meet the requirement for aircraft readiness levels. The result is fewer MC aircraft, which 
reduces the available flight hours below the level in the F/A-18 Training and Readiness 
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(T&R) manual. The end state is aircrew become less tactically proficient and squadrons 
risk failing to meet their mission.  
I. OBJECTIVE 
The MVP is an integer linear program that provides daily fidelity and allows for a 
quantitative assessment to show the WCs that have sufficient manning to complete 
maintenance tasks and others that are overtasked in F/A-18 squadrons. Over a two-year 
period, the MVP provides daily assignment of maintenance activities to available 
Marines from each work center and experience level, with the requirement of keeping a 
standard number of aircraft operationally ready. MVP results show areas of deficit, either 
manpower or available time to complete work on aircraft. By considering results from 
several scenarios, MVP provides an analytic answer to: “What is the correct level of 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been extensive study of military aircraft maintenance, especially as it 
relates to deployment status and increased maintenance caused by age. However, we find 
no published work that uses optimization, such as the MVP, to analyze the manning 
levels of squadrons. Based on this review, there are no models except for MVP that allow 
the detailed investigation of how different manpower levels impact a squadron’s ability to 
keep aging aircraft flying. Below, we review the related research on the amount of 
maintenance an aging aircraft requires and the time available to fix those aircraft. 
Allen (2005) focused on the Navy Standard at-sea workweek in regards to the 
F/A-18C community and the hour requirement differences when on deployment and at 
home. In his analysis, he found the time available during a deployment workweek is 
slightly more than double what is available during an at-home workweek. However, the 
manning level for both deployment and at home is the same with the expectation of 
providing the same level of aircraft readiness. Allen (2005) recommends the addition of 
“shore-duty billets to offset spikes in squadron workload.” 
Additional work in this area was conducted by Matthew Dixon in 2006 while he 
was a student at the Pardee RAND graduate eschool (Dixon 2006). Dixon examined 
“commercial aviation data with the goal of drawing inferences and lessons about aging 
aircraft that may be relevant to the Air Force.” While the type of aircraft he looked at has 
a vastly different mission than an F/A-18, he referenced a Navy study done by the Center 
for Naval Analyses (CNA) in 2000 (Francis and Shaw 2000). There exists a common 
theme between these studies that report how increasing aircraft ages increase 
maintenance costs as well as the maintenance requirement.  
Peter Francis and Geoffrey Shaw of the CNA also did work in this area examining 
the “Effect of Aircraft Age on Maintenance Costs.” In 1999, Dr. Raymond Pyles testified 
before Congress regarding the effect of aging fleets. The authors extrapolated from the 
data given in his testimony that “RAND expects maintenance workloads to rise by about 
5 percent per year” (Francis and Shaw 2000). The authors continued this work by looking 
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at U.S. Navy F/A-18C aircraft from 1989–1999, while new airframes were still entering 
service, to see if there was an increase in maintenance costs as the platform aged. They 
found enough evidence to “support the conclusion that aging aircraft will require higher 
maintenance expenditures” (Francis and Shaw 2000).  
Finally, Bell and Stucker wrote “A Technique for Determining Maintenance 
Manpower Requirements for Aircraft Units” for U.S. Air Force Project RAND. Their 
study continued research into maintenance policies and resource requirements and 
“presents improved methods for determining maintenance manpower levels by evaluation 
of existing aircraft organizations and simulation modeling” (Bell and Stucker 1971). At 
the time, the U.S. Air Force considered manpower utilization rates as the primary 
influence on manning levels. The authors continued work that began in the early 1960s of 
a “time-oriented, event-recording data system” as a better means to “determine the 
criticality of manning levels for various work centers and focuses upon personnel 
requirements to facilitate aircraft turn-around” (Bell and Stucker 1971). Their results did 
not present an answer to the question but did provide “a tool that enables the 
decisionmaker to examine the alternatives more clearly” (Bell and Stucker 1971).  
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III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND FORMULATION 
The MVP is an integer linear program with a primary objective to maximize the 
number of RBA days while penalizing for being below RBA requirements. The MVP 
assigns the hours each day that each Marine in each WC at each skill level works on each 
open MAF. There are constraints for the amount of time each Marine of each skill level 
can work each day (on open MAFs outside of other assigned duties) as well as the 
amount of time available to work on each aircraft each day. There are relaxations 
available in the form of overtime, additional manpower, and more hours to work if a day 
becomes a maintenance day. MVP prescribes when each maintenance day occurs.  
A. PENALTIES 
Not all goals for squadron maintenance can be satisfied all the time so MVP uses 
elastic constraints. Elastic constraints are constraints that can be violated but such 
violation incurs a penalty. These penalties include: being below RBA requirements; 
working overtime; aircraft requiring overtime; extra man-hours, which are additional 
man-hours beyond the capacity of the squadron; and extra aircraft hours, which are hours 
beyond the allowable work day per aircraft. The penalty levels for RBA depend on the 
number of IR each day. The penalty rates at each level of IR are defined by asking, “How 
many extra man-hours and maintenance hours would I be willing to ‘pay’ for an 
additional RBA at this level of IR?”  
B. ELASTIC VARIABLES 
In order to account for the need for extra maintainers, which quantifies how many 
additional personnel are required in a WC, an elastic variable captures the number of 
hours of work over and above overtime. To ensure the MVP does not allocate all the 
hours into one day, penalties are assessed based on increments of the quantity of 
additional hours. Realistically, it may be possible to borrow a maintainer from another 
squadron for a day or two to overcome a spike in workload, which is the first penalty 
level. The subsequent penalty levels support consideration for a permanent increase in 
manning levels. 
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C. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
We assume all aircraft in an IR status start with zero open MAFs on day one. On 
each day, MAFs, for that day are available at the beginning of the day. Our model only 
considers working on aircraft that are IR, and we assume that if a particular MAF 
requires a part, that part is immediately available.  
MVP has a piecewise linear penalty function in the objective that increases 
rapidly through each of the different breakpoints levels and discourages extreme 
deviations from several requirements. We use this structure for the required number of 
RBA, extra man-hours required beyond regular overtime, and extra hours required to 
work on an aircraft beyond available hours. 
MVP does not update the status of an aircraft during a time period. In other 
words, the mission capability status of an aircraft at the start of the day is equal to the 
mission capability status at the end of the previous day. For actual operations, an aircraft 
can vary mission capability levels during the day. It can begin the day as FMC, fly and 
come back NMC with multiple MAFs, and end the day as a PMC aircraft.  
D. FORMULATION  
1. Sets 
j∈J The set of F/A-18 aircraft by Bureau Number (BUNO) [j1..jN] 
k∈K The set of segments of piecewise linear functions [k1..k5] 
m∈M The set of time periods (months) [m1..mN] 
p∈P The set of maintainers ordered by increasing skill level  
  [mech, CDI, CDQAR] 
 
q∈Q The set of production WC [q120, q210, q220, q230, q310, q13B] 
g∈G The set of MAFs 
g∈Gj⊆G The set of MAFs associated with aircraft j 
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g∈GU⊆G The set of PMC MAFs 
g∈GUj⊆G The set of PMC MAFs associated with aircraft j 
g∈GD⊆G The set of NMC MAFs 
g∈GDj⊆G The set of NMC MAFs associated with aircraft j 
j∈ Jg⊆J Aircraft j associated with MAF g 
t∈T The set of time periods (days) [t1..tN] 
t∈Tg⊆T The set of time periods t where work can be completed on MAF g. 
t∈Tj⊆T The set of time periods t where aircraft j is IR status. 
t∈Tm⊆T The set of days t associated with month m. 
 
2. Data 
availp,q,t The working hours available per Marine of skill level p, by WC q, in day t. 
  [hours] 
bt The hours available to fix MAFs on aircraft j, that is MC and could be 
flying, in day t. [hours] 
dt A factor multiplied by the base hours (bt) representing the additional hours 
available to work on an aircraft if it is NMC. 
ejpk,t The penalty for working extra hours on an aircraft at breakpoint k in day t. 
 [RBA/hour] 
eppk,t The penalty for working extra man-hours at breakpoint k in day t.   
 [RBA/hour] 
fd The amount of extra hours available to work if it is a maintenance day. 
   [hours] 
jat The number of aircraft IR in day t. [aircraft] 
t_maintp,q,t The number of Marines of skill level p, by WC q, in day t.   [Marines] 
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m_maintp,q,m The number of Marines of skill level p, by WC q, in month m.   [Marines] 
mainthrsg,p,q The hours required to fix MAF g, by Marine of level p, by WC q. [hours] 
minJ The minimum fraction of RBA, of those in IR status, required each day.  
 [aircraft/aircraft] 
mmd The maximum number of maintenance days allowed per month.   [days] 
nupj,t The cumulative number of PMC MAFs on aircraft j in day t.  [MAFs] 
otd The maximum number of overtime hours available per Marine per day.  
  [hours] 
otjd The maximum number of overtime hours to work on an aircraft per day. 
 [hours] 
otjr The penalty for overtime hours worked on an aircraft.  [RBA/hour] 
otm The maximum number of overtime hours available per Marine per month. 
  [hours] 
otpr The penalty for Marines working overtime.   [RBA/hour] 
penk,t The penalty for being below the required RBA number at breakpoint k in 
day t. 
rate The discount factor. 
rpm The minimum readiness percentage required each month. 
  
3. Positive Continuous Variables 
Ek,t The number of non-RBA at breakpoint k, in day t.   [aircraft] 
EJj,k,t The extra hours worked on aircraft j, at breakpoint k, in day t. [hours] 
EPp,q,k,t The extra man-hours worked by Marines of skill level p, in WC q, at 
breakpoint k, in day t. [hours] 
HDNg,p,p΄,q,t The number of hours of “down” MAF g, of skill level p, completed by 
Marine of skill level p΄, in WC q, in day t. [hours] 
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HUPg,p,p΄,q,t The number of hours of “up” MAF g, of skill level p, completed by 
Marine of skill level p΄, in WC q, in day t. [hours] 
OTp,q,t The overtime hours worked by Marine of skill level p, in WC q, in day t.  
[hours] 
OTJj,t The overtime hours worked on aircraft j in day t. [hours] 
4. Binary Variables 
MDt∈{0,1} Binary variable with value of one if day t is a maintenance day, zero 
otherwise. 
MOD j,t∈{0,1} Binary variable with value of one if aircraft j is either NMC in day t or day 
t is a maintenance day, zero otherwise. 
Rj,t ∈ {0,1} Binary variable with value of one if aircraft j is RBA in day t, zero 
otherwise. 
YDNg,t∈{0,1} Binary variable with value of one if “down” MAF g is completed in day t, 
zero otherwise. 
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Constraint set (1) ensures the hours worked by Marines do not exceed the hours 
available, to include overtime and the elastic variables. Constraint set (2) ensures the hours 
worked on aircraft do not exceed the hours available, to include overtime and the elastic 
variables. Constraint sets (3) and (4) keep track of the hours on each MAF and change the 
MAF status to complete after the accumulation of sufficient hours. Constraint set (5) 
declares an aircraft NMC if there are more than ten PMC MAFs and constraint set (6) 
declares an aircraft NMC if there is at least one NMC MAF. Constraint sets (7) and (8) 
ensure a MAF that is “signed-off” remains “signed-off.” Constraint sets (9), (10), and (11) 
balance the number of MC aircraft with the overall number of IR aircraft and enforce 
minimum RBA and readiness percentage levels. 
Constraint sets (12), (13), and (14) set bounds for the amount of overtime available 
daily and monthly. Constraint sets (15) and (16) limit the number of maintenance days and 
provide extra hours to work on aircraft if the time period is a maintenance day or an aircraft 
is NMC. Constraint sets (17) through (28) identify binary or positive variables.  
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS
The data for this thesis is historical maintenance data from the Decision 
Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation 
(DECKPLATE) (NAVAIR 2016a) reporting system for five USMC F/A-18 squadrons. 
The data covers a two year period, August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2015, for four squadrons 
and a 22 month period, August 1, 2013 to May 31, 2015, for the fifth squadron. Four 
squadrons belong to Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 31 stationed at Marine Corps Air 
Station (MCAS) Beaufort, South Carolina; VMFA-115, VMFA-122, VMFA(AW)-224, 
and VMFA(AW)-533. The fifth squadron, which belongs to MAG-12 at MCAS Iwakuni, 
Japan, is VMFA(AW)-242. VMFA-115 flies the F/A-18A++, VMFA-122 flies the F/A-
18C, and the other three squadrons fly the F/A-18D. The four MAG-31 squadrons 
conduct deployments in support of OEF as well as UDP whereas VMFA(AW)-242 
permanently resides in Iwakuni, Japan and conducts detachments throughout the Pacific 
Area of Responsibility. 
The MVP looks at squadrons individually over the entire time period utilizing the 
manpower, aircraft in the squadron, and the historical maintenance workload. For 
example, as shown in Table 1, VMFA(AW)-242 has 17,953 MAFs over 440 days on 15 
aircraft. As aircraft sometimes change squadrons, the total aircraft is how many had 
recorded MAFs during the time period but each squadron has a maximum of 15 to work 
on at any one time. Out of computational necessity, MVP divides each squadron’s data 
into four instances with each covering at most six months.  
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Table 1.  MAFs, Time Period Covered, and Number of Aircraft per Squadron. Adapted 
from DECKPLATE. 




Max IR Aircraft 
at one time 
VMFA-115 16,341 476 22 14 
VMFA-122 16,233 484 24 15 
VMFA(AW)-224 18,014 483 23 12 
VMFA(AW)-242 17,953 440 15 14 
VMFA(AW)-533 13,467 476 21 13 
There are large variations in the amount of MAFs each squadron has as well as 
the amount of total hour requirements for those MAFs. In particular, VMFA(AW)-242 
has the second-highest number of MAFs despite a time period that is roughly 40 days 
shorter than the other four squadrons while also in the top three of hour requirements in 
14 of the 18 skill levels across all six WCs. One factor affecting this is the amount of 
hours each squadron flies which has a direct impact on the amount of maintenance. For 
each squadron, Table 2 breaks down the monthly summary statistics and Figure 4 shows 
the monthly flight hours for the entire two year period. 
Table 2.  Monthly Summary Statistics of Squadron Flight Hours from Aug 1, 2013 – Jul 
31, 2015. Adapted from DECKPLATE. 






VMFA-115 212.4 201.3 90.9 73.2 377.1 5097.5 
VFMA-122 194.7 155 100 79.5 500.9 4673.7 
VMFA(AW)-224 200.3 165.7 105 51.7 438.7 4807.4 
VMFA(AW)-242 291.8 289 54.5 177.7 404.3 7002.1 
VMFA(AW)-533 195.1 184.2 80.2 85.9 407.5 4682.6 
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Figure 4.  Squadron Flight hours from Aug 1, 2013 – Jul 31, 2015. 
Adapted from DECKPLATE. 
VMFA(AW)-242 does not have the highest number of flight hours in a month but 
over the time period it sustains a high number of flight hours with the smallest deviation. 
Overall, VMFA(AW)-242 flies greater than 1,900 hours more than any of the other 
squadrons. Therefore, due to a higher utilization of aircraft, VMFA(AW)-242 incurs 
more planned maintenance. 
The MVP is implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) 
using CPLEX on a Dell desktop with two 2.3 GHz processors and 128 GB of RAM. We 
solve a six-month MVP instance using a solution cascade (Baker 1997) with a three 
month window with a one month advance. Depending on the squadron and instance, the 
MVP has between 717,000 and 2.9 million variables, of which roughly 70,000 are 
discrete, and the solution time varies between 5.5 and almost 21 hours. Due to the 
magnitude of the MVP, each cascade instance is limited to the first solution found that is 
guaranteed to be within 10% of the optimal solution or two hours.  
A. DATA 
The data used for this thesis is from multiple sources. The number of personnel, to 
include the numbers of CDIs and CDQARs in each WC, is from the Marine Aviation 
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Commanders’ Current Readiness Assessment Tool (MACCRAT) (USMC 2016b), an 
Access database with monthly entries. For any missing data, we use squadron level 
documents to fill in the missing values. The Marines in the quality assurance WC are 
CDQARs in their MOS but they are not included directly in MVP because their 
responsibilities involve more supervision and training than conducting maintenance. 
Squadron maintenance data is from DECKPLATE. 
1. Assumptions 
There are several assumptions regarding maintenance execution and manpower 
management in an F/A-18 squadron. These range from the number of Marines at work 
each day, to the number of usable hours they have to work, to the number of hours an 
aircraft is available for maintenance. We use the following data assumptions: 
 The number of maintainers, to include mechanics, CDIs and CDQARs, 
remains constant throughout a month. 
 Squadrons normally have to provide Marines for the Fleet Assistance 
Program (FAP), where they work at other offices on base. FAPs remove 
personnel from squadron manpower, generally 2–5 Marines, but those 
reductions are not accounted for in the manning data.    
 The squadron can work a 12 on/12 off schedule at most 4 days per month 
or one full day on the weekend, for a maximum of 10 hours of monthly 
overtime. 
 Parts for each MAF are always available. 
 An aircraft is MC once a NMC MAF is “signed-off,” there is no additional 
delay for a FCF. 
 An aircraft is OOR if undergoing an ISR or PMI, otherwise it is IR. 
 An OOR aircraft is removed from the available aircraft to work on and is 
not part of the readiness calculation.  
 The minimum number of RBA each day is 40% of the number of IR 
aircraft. 
 The minimum monthly RBA is 75% of the number of IR aircraft.  
 There are other significant demands on maintainer’s time detailed in 
section 4 of this chapter.  
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2. Manpower Requirements
The maintenance data from DECKPLATE is for all aircraft assigned during the 
period, for every WC, and for all gear that have a maintenance cycle to maintain. As this 
thesis is only analyzing the six production WCs, we remove all other WC MAFs. We also 
remove MAFs that do not belong to aircraft, such as those for ground support equipment.  
There are several steps to calculate the number of hours for each skill level for 
each MAF. DECKPLATE provides two columns that capture time use for a MAF, 
Elapsed Maintenance Time (EMT) and Man-hours. EMT is the “number of clock hours 
involved in making the repair,” or the amount of time each maintainer works, and Man-
hours is “the number of man-hours that were expended to correct the discrepancy” 
(Commander Naval Air Forces [CNAF] 2013), which is the total hours for all maintainers 
that work on a MAF. The first step is to calculate the number of workers on each MAF 
by dividing the Man-hours by EMT. As CDIs and CDQARs are not allowed to inspect 
their own work (CNAF 2013), the result should be a whole number. When the result is 
not a whole number, the result is rounded to the nearest whole number. Subsequently, 
depending on whether a CDQAR is required for the MAF, a one is entered in the CDI or 
CDQAR column and the mechanic column becomes one less than the total number of 
workers. Finally, the resulting quantities are multiplied by EMT to get the hours for each 
skill level for each MAF, as shown in Table 3. Utilizing this method, the hours for the 
total period across all MAFs for each WC, skill level, and squadron are illustrated in 
Figures 5, 6, and 7.  
26 
Table 3.  Snapshot of Maintenance Data from VMFA(AW)-242. Adapted from 
DECKPLATE. 
For example, utilizing the first row, the MAF was received on August 8, 2013, “q310” is 
the Powerline WC, and “j165529” identifies the aircraft. Next, 0.2 is the total hours 
required on the MAF and 0.1 is the EMT used per qualification level. There is a 0.1 in 
both the mech and CDI columns, signifying the time required for each skill level, and a 
0.0 in the CDQAR column because the CDQAR is not required for this MAF. The “D” 
indicates it is an NMC MAF, “GF7220260_3KYBXER” is the MAF identifier, and “N” 
in the “QAR Reqd” column indicates no CDQAR is required to “sign-off” the MAF.  
Rcvd Date WC BUNO Manhours EMT mech CDI CDQAR Up/Down Ind MAF QAR Reqd
Aug 8, 2013 q310 j165529 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 D GF7220260_3KYBXER N
Aug 8, 2013 q310 j165529 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 D GF7220268_3KYBXH8 N
Aug 8, 2013 q310 j165529 17.5 6 12.0 6.0 0.0 D GF7220259_3KYBXEQ N
Aug 8, 2013 q120 j165531 3.7 2.7 0.0 2.7 0.0 D GF7220265_3KYBXGM N
Aug 8, 2013 q220 j165531 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 D GF7220267_3KYBXH5 N
Aug 8, 2013 q210 j165685 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 U GF7220287_3KYBXKM N
Aug 8, 2013 q220 j165685 1 1 0.0 1.0 0.0 U GF7220286_3KYBXKG N
Aug 8, 2013 q210 j165686 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 U GF7220288_3KYBXJL N
Aug 9, 2013 q120 j164667 2.9 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.9 D GF7221328_3KYBXPO Y
Aug 9, 2013 q120 j164667 18.4 6.9 13.8 0.0 6.9 D GF7221311_3KYBXN9 Y
Aug 9, 2013 q13B j164653 4.6 3.6 0.0 3.6 0.0 U GF7221314_3KYBXO2 N
Aug 9, 2013 q210 j164653 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 U GF7221314_3KYBXO3 N
Aug 9, 2013 q220 j164653 3.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.0 D GF7221314_3KYBXO0 N
Aug 9, 2013 q310 j164653 4.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.0 D GF7221315_3KYBXO1 N
Aug 9, 2013 q120 j164659 2.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.0 D GF7221295_3KYBXLC N
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Figure 5.  Total Hours Required for Mechanics For All Squadrons. 
Adapted from DECKPLATE. 




Figure 7.  Total Hours Required for CDQARs for All Squadrons. 
Adapted from DECKPLATE. 
3. Dates 
There is also a requirement to modify the entry date for a MAF. As the MVP uses 
work days and not calendar days, adjustments are made for MAFs that occur on non-
working days. Squadrons submit daily maintenance readiness reports, using the Aviation 
Management Supply and Readiness Reporting (AMSRR) system, to higher headquarters 
for every working day, roughly 240 per year. Squadrons do not generally conduct 
maintenance on weekends or holidays and because those are not working days, there is 
no requirement for an AMSRR. However, squadrons frequently conduct flight operations 
on weekends and holidays. When aircraft return, aircrew enter MAFs and the time stamp 
reflects that day, whether it is a work day or not. As the MVP only considers working 
days as days a squadron submits an AMSRR, MAFs require alignment which consists of 
advancing the entry date to the next day the squadron submits an AMSRR.  
4. Work Day 
The number most important in determining whether an F/A-18 squadron has the 
correct level of manning is the amount of time available to conduct maintenance. There 
are many time requirements for Marines throughout the day, month, and year above and 
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beyond the job of fixing aircraft. We made the breakdown in Table 4 using the following 
assumptions: 
 Day crew is manned with 60% of maintainers, night crew with 40%.
 The squadron conducts two day launches and one night launch daily and
each launch consists of six aircraft.
 Marines have various time constraints, including but not limited to:
standing duty, conducting military training, attending formation, going on
leave, and many others that reduce the time available to work on aircraft.
Table 4.  Breakdown of Available Man-Hours per Workday. 
By aggregating over a year, the end result is a mechanic/technician or CDI has 4.2 
usable hours to conduct maintenance per work day. The CDQAR, who is generally a 
higher rank with more responsibilities such as Division Chief and/or a maintenance 
program manager, has more time requirements and only has 3.2 usable hours to conduct 
maintenance per day. If the CO decides to use overtime, there is a maximum of an 
Day Crew Night Crew
Start 0700 1630
End 1630 0200
Total hours availble on normal day 9.5 9.5 Average work day, not 12 on/12 off
% breakdown of manning 60.00% 40.00% Day crew has higher percentage of personnel
Number of aircraft launches 2 1 2 day launches and 1 night launch
Hours required per launch 1.3 1.3
Total hours set for launch 2.6 1.3
FOD Walk 0.3 0 Day crew does FOD Walk, night crew does not. 
Chow 0.5 0.5 Does not include any other administrative breaks
Maintenance Meeting 0.3 0.3 No work is conducted during maintenance meeting
Miscellaneous (waiting for parts, tool checkout, etc) 0.8 0.8 Many other instances this could involve
Daily Total hours not used on Maintenance 4.5 2.9
Total daily hours available for Maintenance 5 6.6 Leftover hours you can be in work on MAFs
Average days in a month at work 20.08 20.08 With 482 AMSRRs published in a 2 year period, 241/year ~ 20 per month
Monthly Total Hours Available 100.4 132.5
Tech Training (2hrs/week, 4 week/month) 8 8 Tech training is 2 hours per shift per week, 8 hours per month
Ground Training (min per month) 1 1 At a minimum, there is 1 hour of ground training (MarineNet, SAPR, etc)
Formation (1 per month) 1 1 At a minimum, 1 monthly all hands formation 
Duty 4.6 6.4 Once per month 
Leave (30/year = 2.5/month) 12.5 16.5 Every Marine earns 2.5 days of leave per month.
Monthly Total Hours Unavailable 27.1 32.9
Monthly Total Hours Available 100.4 132.528
Total Unavailable hours per month 27.1 32.9
Actual Monthly Hours Available 73.3 99.6 Total monthly hours leftover after accounting for Used Hours
Average available hours/day (20 days in month) 3.7 5.0 Average hours availble for a 20 day working month
Available daily hours per mechanic and CDI
Available daily hours per CDQAR 
Work Day (Available Hours)
Available Man-hours per Workday
Averaged using 60% for day crew,  40% for night crew
4.2
3.2
Setting up/troublehsooting/catching the aircraft.   CDI on that shift is out 
there 45 min prior until 30 min after, no work.
Training/Formations/Duty/Leave (Used Hours)
 30 
additional 2.5 hours per day per Marine of work that can be done, with a monthly 
maximum of ten hours.  
There is also a limit on the number of hours maintainers can work on an aircraft in 
a day. Squadrons target between 285–325 flight hours per month in order to meet T&R 
requirements and using an average flight time of 1.3 hours equates to 220–250 sorties per 
month. Taking into account maintenance days, weather cancellations, and other variables 
throughout a month, scheduling 18 sorties per day, Monday through Friday, enables 
meeting the flight hour goal. We break down the time an aircraft is on the ground and 
maintainers can conduct maintenance in Table 5.  
Table 5.   Available Daily Hours for Aircraft Maintenance.  
 
 
The hours an aircraft is available is as important, if not more so, than the hours 
Marines have to work. If an aircraft is MC the MVP considers it to be flying or available 
to fly and only has 11.5 hours available for maintenance per day. If an aircraft is down, or 
it is a maintenance day, the aircraft has 19 hours available for maintenance per day. If the 
CO decides to work overtime, there is a maximum of an additional five hours each day 
per aircraft of maintenance time.  
5. Parts Availability 
Somewhat unrealistically, MVP assumes a part is available immediately. There 
are three categories of parts availability. The first is parts that are on hand at a squadron, 
such as tires or smaller consumables. The next category is parts that are located at the 
MALS supply division and MALS delivers them when a squadron places a part on order. 
Flight Time 1.3 Per T&R, average flight is 1.3 hours
Number of flights 3 3 launches per day
Total Flight Time 3.9 Sum
Unavailable (45 min prior to launch) 0.7 Aircraft is prepped and no MAFs in work 45 min prior to launch
Total for 3 flights 2.1 Sum
Unavailable (30 min after landing) 0.5 Accounts for taxi, shut down and maintenance debrief, no work being done
Total for 3 flights 1.5 Sum for 3 landings
Total Unavailable Hours 7.5 Sum
Hours aircraft is available if not flying 19 0700-0200 daily work schedule
Hours aircraft is available if flying 11.5 Base amount of time available if conducting all 3 sorties
Aircraft
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Ideally parts arrive at the squadron within an hour and some delivery time is accounted 
for in the work day assumption. The third category is parts that are not in stock. The 
delay for these parts can vary significantly, with some parts requiring shipping from far 
away locations to other parts that are no longer made and replacements are sourced from 
F/A-18s that are no longer airworthy and are either at a museum or the boneyard.  
For aircraft that are NMC and require a part that is not in stock the aircraft is Non-
Mission Capable Supply (NMCS). NMCS is becoming more of an issue as the F/A-18 is 
aging and parts are not available to the point where, “Sometimes it takes the Marines 18 
months to get parts for early model F-18 jets whose production was halted in 2001” 
(Tomlinson and Griffin 2016). For the time period of this thesis, the daily squadron 
average of NMCS aircraft is between 11.9% and 15.9% (NAVAIR 2016a). VMFA(AW)-
242 has a higher priority for parts due to being stationed in Japan and it averages 14.4% 
NMCS during the entire period, shown in Figure 8 (all figures for VMFA(AW)-242 
display the squadron patch in the upper right corner).  
Figure 8.  VMFA(AW)-242 NMCS from Aug 1, 2013 – Jul 31, 2015. 
Source: DECKPLATE 2016. 
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B. PENALTY ASSESSMENT 
There are five penalties assessed in our objective function; two have constant 
slope and three are piecewise linear. The two constant penalties are for overtime hours 
for personnel and overtime hours for working on an aircraft, with the same penalty 
assessment for each hour. The three piecewise linear penalties are: being below required 
RBA, requiring extra man-hours, and requiring extra hours to work on an aircraft. Tables 
6 and 7 show the penalty levels and tolerances for all three piecewise penalties.  
Table 6.  Break Points for RBA Penalties 
 Number 
 of IR 
Penalty 
Level 
7, 8 9, 10 > 11 
1 7 8 9 
2 6 7 8 
3 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 
5 <4 <5 <6 
The Number of Aircraft at Which a Penalty Level Begins. For Example, in a Squadron with 11 
Aircraft IR, Penalty Level 3 Is Used If There Are 7 RBA. 
Table 7.  Piecewise Penalty Levels for Number of Extra Man-Hours Required and 
Number of Extra Hours Required to Work on an Aircraft. 
Penalty Level Lower Bound (hrs) Upper Bound (hrs) 
1 0 < 5 
2 5 < 10 
3 10 < 15 
4 15 < 20 
5 20 ∞ 
C. RESULTS 
MVP’s daily RBA requirement of 40% and monthly RBA requirement of 75% 
cause the MVP to produce higher readiness rates than actually observed in the five 
squadrons. MVP easily accepts other RBA requirements but keeping these higher 
readiness rates compensates somewhat for the assumed parts availability.  
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Each squadron undergoes two scenarios of the MVP. The first scenario allows the 
MVP to utilize one maintenance day each month and the second scenario allows the 
MVP to utilize two maintenance days each month, with no other changes. The focus 
squadron for displaying results and additional scenarios is VMFA(AW)-242 as the 
squadron has the highest number of flight hours and also the lowest volatility in terms of 
aircraft being assigned and reassigned.  
1.  RBA Percentage 
The MVP uses available resources as well as elastic variables to ensure the 
minimum daily RBA percentage is 40% of the IR aircraft. The MVP also ensures the 
monthly RBA percentage rate is 75% of the IR aircraft, which is the MC goal stated in 
the F/A-18A/B/C/D Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix (MESM) (CNAF 2009).  
All five squadrons attain the daily and monthly RBA percentage goals with 
varying utilization levels of overtime and extra time. Figures 9 and 10 show the daily 
RBA percentage in black and the monthly RBA percentage in red for VMFA(AW)-242 
for one and two maintenance days resulting from MVP. Figure 11 shows the monthly 
RBA percentage for scenarios using one and two maintenance days as well as the 
historical RBA percentage.  
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Figure 9.  VMFA(AW)-242 RBA Percentage, One Maintenance Day. 
Figure 10.  VMFA(AW)-242 RBA Percentage, Two Maintenance Days. 
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Figure 11.  VMFA(AW)-242 Monthly RBA Percentage: One Maintenance 
Day, Two Maintenance Days, and Historical. 
The other squadrons have similar results but the big difference is the volatility of 
the excursions in historical RBA percentage. For example, as demonstrated in Figure 9, 
VMFA(AW)-242 comes very close to 40% RBA on a couple of days, but VMFA(AW)-
533 has multiple days of 20% RBA and VMFA-115 drops to 0% on two days.  
2. Aircraft Overtime and Extra Time
In order for the MVP to meet the 40% daily and 75% monthly RBA requirements 
it utilizes overtime and extra time to conduct maintenance on aircraft. Overtime is a 
maximum of five hours available each day, extra time is hours above and beyond the 
overtime that may not be physically accomplished. The elastic variable for extra time is 
extremely important in determining if there is enough time to fix aircraft given the 
current utilization rates.  
Figure 12 shows aircraft BUNO 165528 from VMFA(AW)-242 and how much 
overtime, in gold, and extra time, in red, the MVP uses throughout the time period for the 
one maintenance day scenario resulting from MVP. Figure 13 contains the same data just 
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condensed to the actual days there is overtime and extra time. Figures 14 and 15 reflect 
the same aircraft using the two maintenance day scenario.  
 
Figure 12.  VMFA(AW)-242, BUNO 165528, Overtime and Extra Time 
Hours Required, One Maintenance Day (OT Is Overtime and 
ET Is Extra Time). 
 
Figure 13.  VMFA(AW)-242, BUNO 165528, Overtime and Extra Time 
Hours Required, One Maintenance Day, with Zero-Hour Days 
Removed. 
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Figure 14.  VMFA(AW)-242, BUNO 165528, Overtime and Extra Time 
Hours Required, Two Maintenance Days. 
Figure 15.  VMFA(AW)-242, BUNO 165528, Overtime and Extra Time 
Hours Required, Two Maintenance Days, with Zero-Hour 
Days Removed. 
While there is still a need for overtime and extra time with two maintenance days, 
the amount is significantly less. BUNO 165528 is representative of the average overtime 
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and extra time requirement in VMFA(AW)-242. All squadrons utilize overtime and extra 
time in the MVP with some requiring a far greater number and others somewhat less. 
Without using extra time on these aircraft, and if the 40% daily and 75% monthly RBA 
requirements are removed, the RBA rates fall below those shown in Figures 9 and 10.  
3. Personnel Overtime and Extra Time 
In addition to aircraft overtime and extra time, personnel require overtime and 
extra time in order to meet the RBA requirements set in the MVP. Personnel overtime has 
a daily maximum of 2.5 hours and a monthly maximum of 10 hours.  
The elastic variable for personnel is easier to understand than the one for aircraft 
because the extra hours are possible with additional personnel. There are certainly 
excursions where it is not possible to provide an additional 20 man-hours in one day 
without a substantial increase in the manning level but it does highlight there is an 
abundance of work assigned to that WC and insufficient personnel available.  
Across all five squadrons extra time is used in all WCs to varying degrees. 
Through all three skill levels, in all five squadrons, in WCs 210, 220, 230, and 310, the 
highest total of extra hours used is 35 hours. While those hours are necessary for 
completion of MAFs, it is possible to utilize the senior personnel in the quality assurance 
WC or even borrow a Marine from an adjacent squadron for a few hours. However, the 
remaining two WCs are vastly different.  
The extra hour requirements for WCs 120 and 13B are much higher than the other 
four production WCs. Two of the five squadrons require more than 100 extra hours over 
the entire time period in different skill levels in WC 120 for the one maintenance day 
scenario and one squadron still requires extra hours in the two maintenance day scenario. 
For WC 13B, one squadron requires significant extra hours for all three skill levels in the 
one maintenance day scenario and while the amount is reduced in the two maintenance 
day scenario, the mechanic and CDI skill levels still require more than 50 extra hours. 
For both of these WCs there is also a significant amount of overtime used, far greater 
than any other WC. Figure 16 shows the overtime and extra time for all skill levels in 
WC 120 in VMFA(AW)-242 for one maintenance day and Figure 17 shows two 
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maintenance days, both for the entire time period. For WC 13B, there is a significant 
hours requirement for all skill levels. Figures 18–21 show the overtime and extra time for 
the CDQAR level in WC 13B for both scenarios and Table 8 displays the hours for all 
skill levels and both scenarios in WC 13B.  








Figure 18.  VMFA(AW)-242, WC 13B, CDQAR, Overtime and Extra 
Time Hours Required, One Maintenance Day 
41 
Figure 19.  VMFA(AW)-242, WC 13B, CDQAR, Overtime and Extra 
Time Hours Required, One Maintenance Day, with Zero-Hour 
Days Removed. 
Figure 20.  VMFA(AW)-242, WC 13B, CDQAR, Overtime and Extra 
Time Required, Two Maintenance Days. 
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Figure 21.  VMFA(AW)-242, WC 13B, CDQAR, Overtime and Extra 
Time Required, Two Maintenance Days, With Zero-Hour Days 
Removed. 
Table 8.  Hours Required For VMFA(AW)-242, WC 13B, All Skill Levels, Overtime 











Overtime 1 235.65 77.3 100.12 
Extra Time 1 168.3 139.76 151.32 
Overtime 2 122.95 35.04 50 
Extra Time 2 53.35 56.1 12.5 
4. Hours Utilization
The utilization of hours across WCs is fairly steady and the need for additional 
man-hours is usually available by working overtime. However, there are WCs, 
specifically WCs 120 and 13B, which at times do not have sufficient manpower available 
to complete all work. Figure 22 shows the available and required hours for the CDI level 
in WC 120 in VMFA(AW)-242 using two maintenance days. There are periods of under-
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utilization but there are also many days where the correct amount of hours are available. 
Blue spikes indicate maintenance days and where a green spike is higher than the blue, 
for example in the vicinity of t181, indicates a day where MVP utilizes extra hours.  
Figure 22.  VMFA(AW)-242, WC 120, CDI, Available and Required 
Hours, Two Maintenance Days. 
Figure 23 shows a large gap between the available and required hours for the 
technician skill level in WC 210. However, one assumption in the MVP is that FAPs 
have not been removed from the squadron manning level. Normally, if a squadron has to 
provide a FAP and it is sourced from the maintenance department, it will generally be 
from WC 210. However, if a reduction is made accounting for five FAPs from the 
technician skill level in WC 210, it equates to 21 less available hours. At a minimum, 
there are still 29 hours available which is greater than the maximum requirement for the 




Figure 23.  VMFA(AW)-242, WC 210, Technician, Available and 
Required Hours, Two Maintenance Days. 
5. Manpower Excursion 
In order to see the effects of altering the manpower in one of the two WCs that 
requires a large amount of overtime and extra time, we ran an excursion to show the 
sensitivity of the hour requirements due to a reduction of key personnel. This excursion is 
run with the number of CDQARs in WC 13B reduced by one in VMFA(AW)-242 for one 
of the six month periods. Both maintenance day scenarios are run as well as a third which 
allows for three maintenance days each month.  
The time period for this excursion is January 2014 to July 2014, which coincides 
with t118-t245 in the MVP. In the original scenario of the MVP, WC 13B has two 
CDQARs for two of the months and one CDQAR for the other four months. By reducing 
the number of CDQARs by one, WC 13B has one CDQAR for two months and zero 
CDQARs for four months.  
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Overall, there is a large increase in the amount of overtime and extra time for all 
three skill levels. The amount of extra time the MVP utilizes for the one maintenance day 
scenario at the CDQAR skill level increases from a baseline total of 98.3 hours to a total 
of 160.2 hours in the excursion. In the two maintenance day scenario, the extra hour 
requirement at the CDQAR level increases from a baseline total of 67.6 hours to 181.8 
hours in the excursion. The decrease is natural to see from 98.3 to 67.6 hours in the one 
maintenance day scenario but the increase to 181.8 in the two maintenance day scenario 
is not. The MVP, while maintaining a similar readiness, chooses a different solution that 
entails using different maintenance days as well as utilizing a different amount of hours 
from other WCs. For example, the amount of extra time in the two maintenance day 
scenario at the CDQAR level in WC 120 also increases, going from a baseline of 20 total 
hours to 71.9 total hours in the excursion.  
We run a third excursion to see if the amount of overtime and extra time can be 
countered with the addition of a third maintenance day. There is a dramatic decrease in 
the amount of overtime and extra time requirements but the CDQAR level still requires a 
total of 105.4 extra hours in order to maintain the required readiness levels.  
We run another excursion to see the effects of adding a CDI to the WC 13B 
baseline manning level in the two maintenance day scenario. The addition of the CDI 
causes a drastic reduction in the extra time required in all three skill levels. The total 
extra hours required at the mechanic level reduces from 137.3 to 73 hours, from 185.1 to 
147.4 hours at the CDI level, and 181.8 to 79 hours at the CDQAR level. Although the 
extra hours are still high they are more manageable.  
Finally, in order to remain within the historic manning level, we remove three 
technicians from WC 210 and add a mechanic and a CDI to WC 13B for the same six-
month instance as the previous excursions. This change does not cause any requirement 
for overtime or extra time hours by any WC 210 skill level but it does reduce the extra 
time hour requirement for all skill levels in WC 13B to zero and also eliminates the WC 
120 extra time requirements.  
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D. ANALYSIS 
The MVP adheres to all constraints and abides by all assumptions to attain the 
daily and monthly RBA requirements. However, it is not able to do so without utilizing 
the elastic variables for man-hours and extra hours to work on an aircraft. The use of the 
elastic variables highlight areas of concern.  
One of the major assumptions in the MVP is parts are always available. This is 
not always the case in reality but this is an area where improvement is possible. MALS 
has a goal of 85% net supply effectiveness, which is effectiveness at filling requirements 
that are supposed to be in stock, and a goal of 65% gross supply effectiveness, which is 
effectiveness at filling all requirements (Naval Supply Systems Command 2014). The net 
supply effectiveness aligns closely with the historic NMCS rate of each squadron during 
the time period. One of the major insights gained by using this assumption is if parts are 
available, in most cases there is sufficient manpower available to fix the aircraft.  
Extra time required to work on an aircraft may signify reduced readiness. To gain 
additional hours to work on aircraft, certain improvements can be realized that are not 
modeled in the MVP, such as being able to work on multiple MAFs on the same aircraft 
at the same time, but those are likely not enough to cover the amount of extra hours the 
MVP utilizes. Even allowing MVP to utilize two maintenance days does not eradicate the 
need for extra time. Additional manpower can only do so much which means the only 
other option is a reduction in readiness.  
The ability to look back and see periods where a lot of overtime and extra time is 
required to meet the MESM goal of 75% is helpful in planning the future of F/A-18 
maintenance. Using the amount of overtime and extra time hours the MVP utilizes in 
WCs 120 and 13B highlight those WCs as ones squadrons should take great care in 
manning and using for other tasks besides maintenance. The maintenance days the MVP 
selects align with days both WCs require overtime and extra time which dictates paying 
close attention to the workload each WC has. For WC 13B, specifically because the 
number of Marines is never greater than ten, it is extremely important to manage the 
manpower very carefully as removing a Marine of any skill level, highlighted by the 
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reduction of one CDQAR in one of the excursions, has drastic effects on the extra work 
requirements. Conversely, the addition of manpower to WC 13B countered with a 
reduction to WC 210 manning, has no negative effects on WC 210 and a large reduction 
in the amount of extra hours required of WC 13B personnel.  
 48 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
49 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis provides the ability to plan maintenance based on events that have 
already occurred. The amount and type of MAFs a squadron has will change over time 
but the utilization of a two year period for the MVP accounts for variations in 
deployment schedules as well as hourly maintenance cycles. The workload a squadron 
has in the future will be similar though it is expected to grow as the F/A-18 continues to 
fly past the original design specification. It is crucial that the insights gained from this 
research inspire conversations and plans for action if the USMC desires to continue 
operating the F/A-18 in the same manner for years to come.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Manning
Consideration should be given to realigning the manpower level in WC 13B, 
specifically in the VMFA(AW) squadrons. The manning levels across all five squadrons 
in WC 13B is generally the same for the two-year period considered in this thesis. 
However, in the VMFA(AW) squadrons there are twice as many ejection seats to 
maintain and generally more environmental control system issues on the F/A-18D due to 
having the same system as the F/A-18A and F/A-18C, but having two of everything to 
cool from aircrew to displays. Reducing the number of Marines in WC 210 and applying 
those increases to WC 13B would provide a reduction in the amount of overtime and 
extra time requirements WC 13B currently has. Increases across all three skill levels in 
WC 13B are beneficial but the increase in the mechanic and CDI levels are something 
that can provide benefit relatively quickly as shown in this thesis. 
Additionally, though there is an apparent surplus of available hours in WCs when 
viewed from a MVP perspective, such as the technician level in WC 210, squadrons need 
to keep all available personnel. There are additional duties not considered by MVP, 
because the time requirements do not appear on MAFs, that squadrons deal with daily 
such as being part of a tow crew to move an aircraft in or out of a hangar. Those duties 
are normally filled by WCs that are not busy.  
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Squadrons track the levels of qualifications and certifications on a Maintenance 
Core Competency (MCC) spreadsheet and report it monthly to their higher headquarters 
as maintenance capability. The levels on the MCC are commensurate with the ability to 
conduct two shifts of maintenance daily. The two shifts are broken down into a day crew, 
working from 0700–1630, and a night crew, working from 1630–0200. The MCC report 
displays squadron numbers in all qualification, certification, and licensing areas and there 
is a comparison against the requirements, as “developed by senior maintainers throughout 
the fleet” (CMC 2015) to highlight areas of concern. The onus is on the squadron to make 
qualifications from within and not rely on inbound Marines to satisfy the requirements 
for two-shift maintenance. 
 One of the reasons squadrons cannot rely on inbound Marines to fulfill the 
requirements of two-shift maintenance is because there are no additional MOS categories 
that identify a Marine as a CDI or CDQAR. In contrast, aviators receive an additional 
MOS when they graduate from the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course which 
monitors can use to track qualification levels of squadrons and send WTIs to squadrons 
or MAGs that require an increase in manning. There are few WTIs in a squadron but they 
are necessary for mission success. In a similar way, there are few CDQARs in a squadron 
but they are extremely important for mission success and squadrons need a sufficient 
allocation.  
The assignment of Marines to squadrons is based solely on rank, with the 
expectation that rank equates to qualification levels, i.e., the expectation is a sergeant is a 
CDI or a CDQAR. This is not always the case. Given the need for CDIs and CDQARs, as 
shown in the results of this thesis, consideration should be given to creating two 
additional MOSs that identify Marines as either a CDI or CDQAR. The creation of these 
two MOSs will assist monitors in identifying the needs of squadrons and directing 




The scenarios between one maintenance day and two maintenance days do not 
reflect a large increase in RBA percentage due to the minimum requirements in the MVP. 
However, they do highlight ways to overcome the use of overtime and extra time. Extra 
time is possible for maintainers but the only way to create extra time to work on aircraft 
is for the aircraft to be NMC for a longer period of time which reduces RBA. Squadrons 
should strive to schedule two maintenance days each month and give strong consideration 
to an additional day if a backlog of MAFs is occurring.  
3. WCs 120 and 13B
A final insight is the importance WCs 120 and 13B have in terms of maintenance 
operations. These two WCs drive when the MVP elects to utilize maintenance days. It is 
therefore essential to keep a close eye on the workload both of these WCs have in order 
to inform maintenance day decisions. The inundation of WC 120 or 13B with MAFs is a 
good indication for the CO and AMO to consider creating a maintenance day.  
B. RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a few areas in which this research can be continued. One of the major 
assumptions in the MVP is parts availability. Data is available in DECKPLATE that 
contains maintenance wait times for many areas, but one specific area is waiting for a 
part to arrive. The MVP could be modified to account for time waiting for a part to arrive 
before work on a MAF can begin. 
This research could also consider the tools available to work on aircraft. For 
example, whenever there is an issue with the landing gear an aircraft is raised up on 
jacks. There are not enough sets of jacks to put all aircraft in the air, generally a squadron 
is fortunate if there are two sets available.  
The MVP can also be applied to other type, model, or series of aircraft in the 
military. Specifically, it would be beneficial for a newer platform, such as the JSF, to 
have a baseline of manpower usage and as the aircraft ages, run the MVP again and 
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